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rise to the challenge of energy and the en-
vironment, ﬁ nd a way to universal health 
insurance, and devise a New Deal for the 
young, including a new national service. 
These are worthy causes – but enough of a 
platform for liberal enthusiasm in a politi-
cally cynical population?
The Bush administration has sought 
uncontrolled power, both in domestic pol-
itics by asserting executive privilege, and 
in international politics by unilateralism. 
Both failed and rendered weak a state that 
should have been strong. That has been 
traumatic. Starr is probably right to ad-
vise the liberals to exploit the failure of the 
neo-conservative experiment and proba-
bly right that they have no chance to be put 
back in power again if they cannot promise 
a new era of American glory and respect. 
Therefore, he proposes to sell the liberal 
project by speaking loudly about power 
and softly about equality. Accept the prin-
ciple of rule by law and constitutional con-
straints, he says, and America will again be 
strong. But on poverty, for example, he is 
unable to say that it should be eradicated 
in the world’s richest country, only that it 
should be reduced.
There probably is no electoral ma-
jority to be found in America on a pro-
gramme that makes social justice the big 
issue. What is realistic is to smuggle in a 
bit of justice on the coattails of an ideology 
of power. If so, let us welcome that liber-
al project. No liberal who has encountered 
present American neo-conservatism can 
but welcome any strategy that may lead to 
its fall from grace. A pure strategy of so-
cial justice would be a prettier sight, but so 
what, if it cannot be effective?
But it is still a sad state of affairs in 
American culture that even in the wake of 
an administration that has brought disgrace 
on the nation and succeeded only in fur-
ther enriching the already very rich, there 
is no space for a serious reform movement 
around the value of social justice. Europe-
an liberals today do not have much to learn 
from their American brethren. The politi-
cal battle-lines locate differently on the two 
sides of the Atlantic. In Europe it’s about 
controlling the centre ground, in America 
about defeating the far right.
Stein Ringen
Anna J. Merritt – Richard L. Merritt 
(eds.): Public Opinion in Semisovereign 
Germany (The HICOGS Surveys, 
1949–1955)
Urbana, Chicago, London 1980: University 
of Illinois, 273 pp.
This book presents a representative and 
summarised selection of ﬁ nal reports from 
public opinion research that was conduct-
ed in semi-occupied semi-sovereign Ger-
many between 1949 and 1955. The book’s 
editors, Richard L. Merritt (professor of po-
litical science) and Anna J. Merritt (editor 
and staff associate) have both long worked 
at the University of Illinois in Urbana-
Champaign and have intensively studied 
the development of Germany since 1945. 
Other important publications by them in-
clude Public Opinion in Occupied Germany 
and Politics, Economics and Society in the Two 
Germanies, 1945–1975.
The role of the occupying administra-
tions (US, UK, France, USSR) in each of the 
individual occupied zones established im-
mediately after German territory was occu-
pied was of key signiﬁ cance for the future 
course of development of post-war Ger-
many. The six years of semi-sovereignty 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
were marked by economic growth and po-
litical stability under Konrad Adenauer as 
the ﬁ rst Federal Chancellor. While in 1949 
the economy lay in ruins, by 1955 full em-
ployment had been achieved, along with a 
relatively prosperous living standard. The 
FRG joined France, Italy, and the Benelux 
countries in the early stages of the process-
es of Western European economic integra-
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tion, and within the framework of NATO 
the country’s rearmament was permitted. 
The country’s functioning democratic sys-
tem and the decision to pay reparations to 
the state of Israel for the crimes committed 
against Jews in Nazi Germany mitigated 
fears about the future development of Ger-
many. 
While the historical features of the pe-
riod of partial sovereignty of the FRG are 
known, less is known about the transfor-
mation of the social climate in the Western 
occupation zones. (See, for example, Karl 
W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germa-
ny Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest 
Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German 
Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, 
1959). The Allied occupying administra-
tions, which were to lay the foundations of a 
new, democratic Germany, needed to know 
the answers to some pressing questions: to 
what extent had German society rejected 
Nazism; to what extent did the FRG gov-
ernment and the democratic system enjoy 
political legitimacy; what did people think 
about the country’s rearmament; how did 
they view the country’s economic cooper-
ation with France and other Western Eu-
ropean countries (formerly Germany’s en-
emies); how did they perceive the threat 
from the Soviet Union; how signiﬁ cant 
were the plans for the reuniﬁ cation of Ger-
many, and so on. And no less important, it 
was also necessary to objectively evaluate 
the mood of the population towards the Al-
lied occupying administrations.
Politicians, especially those from the 
conservative CDU (Christian Democrat-
ic Union), quickly grasped the beneﬁ t of 
public opinion polls. Consequently, pub-
lic opinion polling agencies experienced 
an unprecedented boom at the start of 
the 1950s; for example, EMNID an agency 
from Bielefeld and especially Institut für 
Demoskopie (under the direction of Eliza-
beth Noelle and E. P. Neumann). Even be-
fore ﬁ ghting ended, a group of social psy-
chologists and sociologists had been set up 
in Germany under the Psychological War-
fare Division of the US Army for the pur-
pose of conducting the ﬁ rst polls, which 
focused on the potential for possible resist-
ance and the expectations connected with 
permanent military occupation, attitudes 
toward Nazism, and so on. In October 1945 
this research was institutionalised with the 
founding of the Opinion Survey Section 
of the Information Control Division of the 
Ofﬁ ce of Military Government (OMGUS), 
which conducted seventy-two public opin-
ion polls in the American occupation zone. 
In September 1949 the military occu-
pation formally ended and OMGUS was 
replaced by the US High Commission for 
Germany (HICOG), and in its Public Af-
fairs division the Reactions Analysis Staff 
(RAS) continued the work on sociological 
research. Research operations were direct-
ed by Dr. Leo P. Crespi. At the end of 1950 
the sample of respondents was extended to 
take in the entire area of the FRG and the 
RAS began to work closely on data col-
lection with a newly established agency, 
Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen (DIVO). 
Over the course of its ﬁ ve-and-a-half year 
existence the HICOG Reactions Analysis 
Staff carried out more than one hundred 
public opinion polls in West Germany. 
These polls were mainly of two types. The 
ﬁ rst type was the regular monthly polls, 
requiring the ﬁ eld collection of data over a 
duration of three weeks and based on inter-
views with approximately three thousand 
adult respondents from the area previous-
ly encompassed within the American oc-
cupation zone, along with 500 inhabitants 
in West Berlin, and 300 respondents in the 
American-controlled enclave of Bremen in 
the former British zone. A speciﬁ c feature 
was the use of the ‘split-sample’ method, 
wherein the sample was divided into two 
halves, each of which was presented with a 
slightly different questionnaire.
The second type was ‘ﬂ ash’ polls, 
the aim of which, using a relatively small 
sample of 640 respondents, was to ob-
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tain a quick idea of the attitudes of peo-
ple in large towns throughout the entire 
FRG, and not just in the American zone. 
In March 1951 “ﬂ ash” polls were replaced 
with an ‘intermediate’ sample of 800 West 
Germans nationwide, based on stratiﬁ ed 
probability sampling. Some polls also in-
cluded citizens of the GDR visiting or hav-
ing ﬂ ed to West Berlin. The acquired data 
were then analysed and published in peri-
odicals. 
The book under review is based on the 
authors’ study of 237 survey reports pub-
lished between September 1949 and May 
1955. Basic data are presented for each re-
port: the report number and the date of 
its preparation, the title or sub-title of the 
poll, the characteristics of the sample, and 
the data of data collection. The thematic 
range of poll topics is broad, covering the 
opinions of West Germans on adult educa-
tion, Western European uniﬁ cation, or the 
agricultural exhibitions organised by the 
United States Information Service (USIS). 
The authors selected and sorted the re-
ports according to the seriousness of the 
topics and they endeavoured to structure 
the work by dividing it into two basic the-
matic areas. The ﬁ rst includes polls on atti-
tudes towards various aspects of the activi-
ties of HICOG and relates mainly to West 
Germany’s transition in the aftermath of 
Nazi dominance. The second encompasses 
topics focusing on the FRG’s foreign policy 
and opinions on East Germans and the ef-
ﬁ ciency of the US information programme. 
From the perspective of this Czech re-
viewer, it is interesting to observe how the 
situation of the Cold War and the rapid po-
larisation of West and East that emerged 
out of the ruins of the anti-Hitler coali-
tion facilitated a rapid rapprochement of 
former adversaries. This applied not just 
to the relationship between Germany and 
the United States but also to that between 
the Germans and the populations of West-
ern Europe. The deeply felt experience of a 
common threat within a new situation re-
sulted in the relatively rapid internalisa-
tion of attitudes of ‘reconciliation’.
The purpose of the post-war Allied oc-
cupation of Germany was to prevent the 
country from ever becoming a threat to its 
European neighbours again in the future. 
The primary tool was the ‘re-education’ 
of Germans towards democracy. More de-
tailed analyses from the start of the 1950s 
indicated that only one-third of respond-
ents rejected National Socialism outright: 
‘In eight nationwide surveys conducted 
from May 1951 to December 1952, an av-
erage of 41 per cent saw more good than 
evil in Nazi ideas, and 36 per cent more 
evil than good. Only a tiny minority (4%) 
thought that all Germans bore a certain 
guilt for Germany’s actions during the 
Third Reich although many more (21%) 
felt some responsibility for rectifying these 
wrongs.’ (p. 7) The analyses also revealed 
repeatedly that the population as a whole 
was divided in their assessment of basic is-
sues: what some regarded as the mainte-
nance of law and order, others saw as the 
absence of freedom. 
The treatment of the Jews was an es-
pecially delicate topic in post-war Germa-
ny. Respondents repeatedly assessed the 
persecution of Jews and other minorities 
among the bad practices of National Social-
ism. Only 5% saw a sense in collective guilt, 
while ‘59 per cent saw no need for guilt or 
responsibility except for those who real-
ly committed something’. One-ﬁ fth (21%) 
even argued that ‘the Jews themselves were 
partly responsible for that happened to 
them during the Third Reich’ (p. 9).
However, at the same time, the large 
majority of respondents strongly sup-
ported the drafting of legislation to pro-
tect Jews living in West Germany, even 
though many Germans (27%) believed that 
it would probably be better for those Jews 
still in Germany to leave the country. Con-
versely, two out of three West German citi-
zens asked “urged the Bundestag to reject 
an agreement of August 1952 according 
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to which the Federal Republic was to pay 
715 million US dollars to Israel as restitu-
tion for what had happened to Jews during 
the Third Reich’ (p. 9). 
While West Germans expressed deep 
regret over the crimes committed, they saw 
very little use in the idea of personal or col-
lective responsibility for those crimes. With 
regard to the trials with war criminals, at 
the start of 1950 polls recorded three basic 
trends in German public opinion. The ﬁ rst 
trend expressed disappointment in the jus-
tice practised by the occupying powers 
during the course of the Nuremberg and 
other trials. The number of people that sup-
ported the claim that the trials were unfair 
rose from 6% to 30% within the month of 
October 1946 alone. The second trend was 
the view that the time had come to end the 
war crime trials, and by the middle of 1952 
only 59% of respondents agreed with the 
approach the Western powers were tak-
ing. The third trend in opinions expressed 
a growing feeling that the very purpose 
of the original trials was just a feeble at-
tempt at enforcing the law. ‘Respondents 
saw political motives driving the hands of 
the judges. Bolstering this perception was 
resentment that commando raiders who 
killed the German prisoners, pilots who 
had bombed Dresden and Hiroshima, and 
those who had committed the Katyn Forest 
massacres were never prosecuted.’ (p. 11) 
When at the start of 1950 the allies light-
ened some of the sentences, the majority of 
Germans saw it as pure opportunism, de-
signed to obtain their support for the ﬁ ght 
against the Soviet Union. 
Opinions on the process of denaziﬁ ca-
tion evolved in a manner similar to that of 
the views on the war crime trials. At the 
start of the 1950s the whole idea acquired 
a negative reputation. Two out of three re-
spondents believed that the former mem-
bers of the Nazi party should have the 
same opportunities in business and poli-
tics as other Germans. This did not means 
that Germans longed for the return of 
former Nazis to positions of power, but just 
that they did not see them as a threat to the 
state’s democratic development. 
An important factor in the viability 
of the new democracy was the role of po-
litical parties in the political system of the 
FRG. The left of the political spectrum was 
represented by the Social Democratic Par-
ty (SPD) and the right by a bloc of Chris-
tian democratic parties (CDU/CSU). The 
year 1953 marked a turning point when 
the SPD began to lose its position and pub-
lic opinion inclined towards the conserva-
tive right. In 1949 the right won 35% of the 
mandates but in 1957 it managed to win 
270 seats in the Bundestag. Support for the 
government of Chancellor Adenauer long 
hovered around 70%, and he as a ﬁ gure, 
and his international prestige, signiﬁ cantly 
contributed to these high ratings. 
A decisive point in the construction 
of the FRG’s relationships to countries in 
Western Europe and the United States was 
the escalating tensions in international re-
lations, especially following the outbreak 
of the Korean War in 1950. Americans espe-
cially pressed for the inclusion of the FRG 
in the defence system of the West. ‘Given 
these dramatic shifts in Allied policy, the 
analysis of public opinion data is especial-
ly relevant to an understanding of postwar 
West German society.’ (p. 19)
West German society was also divid-
ed over the question of its rearmament and 
the creation of its own army. In the wake 
of the brutal wartime experiences, an anti-
militaristic spirit dominated the immediate 
post-war period. However, that situation 
changed quickly: ‘A series of thirteen sur-
veys conducted by the Institut für Demosko-
pie from November 1950 to February 1955 
yielded an average of 41 per cent who fa-
vored an independent German army and 
40 per cent who opposed it.’ (p. 46) Sup-
port for the FRG’s membership in NATO 
peaked in 1950, when the Korean War 
broke out. A year later it fell to 52%. When 
the Paris Agreements came into effect in 
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May 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany 
was set on the path to re-armament: ‘Bol-
stered by the explicit blessing of the West-
ern occupying powers and the support of 
its own population. What had been un-
thinkable ten years earlier was now accom-
plished fact.’ (p. 23)
In the current context of the domestic 
debate within Germany over the post-war 
integration of millions of displaced people, 
mostly ethnic Germans transferred from 
Eastern and Central Europe, it is interest-
ing to note a poll that was conducted in 
August 1951 in the refugee camps in West 
Germany. The ﬁ ndings provide an idea 
of what those people had been through: 
‘A sense of rejection by the outside world 
was extensive. As many as 42 per cent had 
never been helped by any relief or welfare 
group, and some never even heard of such 
organisations.’ (p. 166) These incoming 
Germans were for the most part met with 
a cool reception. They were regarded as a 
burden, adding to the already complicated 
situation in a country devastated by war. 
‘A large number of the respondents in this 
survey did not seem to want to be assimi-
lated into German life. As many as 64 per 
cent claimed to have no friends among na-
tive Germans. 48 per cent felt that employ-
ers preferred to hire natives.’ (p. 166) It is 
no surprise that in this situation many 
longed to return to their former homes, 
however much under the given circum-
stances that was impossible: ‘A solid ma-
jority (72%) said they would like to return 
to their homeland. Most felt that the East-
ern nations and their communist govern-
ments, as well as the Great Powers, were 
responsible for their expulsion.’ (p. 167)
The American reconciliation strategy 
after 1949, when it was transferred to the 
authority of the bodies of the FRG, focused 
mainly on an information policy (the use of 
radio stations like RIAS Berlin, which 99% 
of respondents were listening to in 1949, 
and Voice of America, and the magazine 
publications Amerikanische Rundschau, Der 
Monat, Heute, Neue Auslese, etc.). Another 
important component in the US informa-
tion programme was the ‘American Hous-
es’ information centres (which had a large 
library and numerous ﬁ lms and offered 
professional lectures), which were attend-
ed primarily by people with a university-
level education (34%). Despite the costs the 
entire programme was evaluated as very 
successful, and it continued long after the 
occupying role of the United States had ﬁ n-
ished. It signiﬁ cantly contributed to shap-
ing the ideas of the social elites who then 
inﬂ uenced the wider social strata. 
The reviewed book represents a val-
uable contribution to the understanding 
of the development of society in post-war 
West Germany through authentic contem-
porary reﬂ ections mediated in sociologi-
cal form by public opinion polls. It is also 
evident from the content of the polls that 
among the Allies it was mainly the Unites 
States that strove to establish a democratic 




Sandrine Cazes – Alena Nešporová: 
Flexicurity: A Relevant Approach 
in Central and Eastern Europe
Geneva 2003: International Labour Ofﬁ ce, 
XIV and 262 pp. 
For several years and across developed Eu-
rope, ﬂ exicurity has been considered one 
of the main tools for coping with the chal-
lenges of globalisation. While globalisation 
is considered to be beneﬁ cial for growth 
and employment, it also requires adequate 
responses from the labour market and so-
cial protection systems. Following the re-
newed EU Lisbon strategy, more and better 
jobs should be created through ﬂ exibility 
and security. A group of seven top experts 
set up by the European Commission, in its 
thorough report ‘on pathways towards im-
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